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1 Introduction
The equity premia in some small open economies are quite high. For example, the equity
premia in Argentina and Brazil are, respectively, 12.72% and 19.68%. However, the literature
on equity premia in small open economies with production is rather thin in the two and a
half decades following the seminal work of Mehra and Prescott (1985). The difficulty in
generating the long-run equity premium in such an economy is that the exogenous world
interest rate, as one important driving force, is quite smooth. As a result, the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) is not volatile enough. Since a volatile IMRS is required
to replicate high equity premia, simply extending, for example, either the Jermann (1998) or
Boldrin et al. (2001) models from a closed economy to a small open economy fails to achieve
what these models accomplish in the closed economy case. More specifically, in a small open
economy characterized by those models, large changes in business cycle moments have only a
trivial effect on equity premia. To handle this problem in light of the smooth world interest
rate issue, we impose borrowing and lending costs to make the IMRS more volatile.
By introducing borrowing and lending costs, we break down the direct link between the
volatility of the world risk-free rate and the volatility of the IMRS. This mechanism makes
the supply of debt inelastic and forces consumption to become more sensitive to exogenous
shocks. Thus, with these new costs, we magnify the volatility of the IMRS by linking it to
the borrowing and lending margin alongside the exogenous world interest rate. Under this
condition adjustment costs generate sufficiently high volatility of equity returns, while use
of the Greenwood et al. (1988) (henceforth GHH) utility function depresses the volatility
in generated consumption. As a result, with three modifications, GHH preferences, capital
adjustment costs, and borrowing and lending costs, we are able to match key business cycle
moments and long-run equity returns as observed in the data. This is the first paper in
the literature to do so in a small open economy with production. As such, our model is a
suitable vehicle in which to carry out policy analysis since it satisfies what Barro (2009) calls
the “Atkeson-Phelan principle,” after Atkeson and Phelan (1994), in that it replicates the
way small open economies price consumption uncertainty.
Our work is related to three strands of the existing literature. First, it builds upon
work done on the equity premium puzzle in a closed economy. The models in this literature
range from consumption-based to production-based asset pricing models. Consumption-
based asset pricing models employ various types of preferences. Mehra and Prescott (1985)
were the first to show that the equity premium puzzle cannot be explained under constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility since the consumption profile, based on historical data,
is quite smooth.
Campbell and Cochrane (1999) explained equity premia by linking asset prices to devi-
ations of consumption from an external habit. The mechanism is as follows. In comparison
to CRRA utility, as consumption reverts towards habit in business cycle troughs, the curva-
ture of the habit formation utility function rises more sharply, which causes asset prices to
fall and expected returns to rise more, accordingly. As a result, with habit formation, even
though consumption is smooth, the IMRS can be quite volatile.
With Epstein and Zin (1991) preferences, the coefficient of risk aversion and the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution (IES) are separated. As a result, the equity premium is not
only a function of the consumption profile. It is also a function of volatile consumption-
delivering portfolio returns; see Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Bansal (2008), among others.
In an endowment economy, this separation between the coefficient of risk aversion and the
IES is sufficient to generate the equity premium.
However, altering the utility function alone is not sufficient to explain equity premia in
a production economy. As shown in Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al. (2001), the reason
for this failure is the relatively low volatility of the rate of return on equity generated by
the model. To explain the equity premium, it is necessary to boost this volatility. This
can be accomplished by introducing investment adjustment costs. However, this innovation
will result in a higher volatility of consumption growth in a CRRA setting. Introduction of
habit formation depresses the volatility of the generated consumption, and hence reconciles
the results with smooth historical consumption data. In a closed production economy, both
Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al. (2001) are able to match the moments of business cycles
and equity premia with investment adjustment costs and habit formation preferences. With-
out adjustment costs in a similar setting, Constantinides and Duffie (1996) and Tallarini Jr.
(2000) are not successful in doing this. The major shortcoming of all these DSGE models
of asset pricing is the “risk-free rate volatility problem”: to explain the equity premium it
is necessary to increase the variation in the IMRS, which results in highly volatile risk-free
rates that are at odds with the observed data.
This paper is also motivated by the literature on asset pricing in a small open economy.
Mendoza and Smith (2006) is an important representative of such work. They focus, however,
on the short-run dynamics of the equity premium due to potential sudden stops. Accordingly,
their model cannot generate the equity premium in the long run since sudden stops are
very rare events. In comparison, our research is concerned with the long-run dynamics of
equity premia. We believe our long-run emphasis is warranted since, as noted above, the
data show that long-run equity premia are huge for some arguably important small open
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economies. Further, heretofore no mechanism has been provided in the literature to explain
these observed long-run equity premia. Our analysis shows that, for a small open economy
with production, to replicate equity premia it is not sufficient to use GHH preferences and
impose investment adjustment costs. We need to also assume borrowing and lending costs.
This is due to the behavior of the world risk-free interest rate, which is one of the most
important driving forces in a small open economy. As noted above, its observed volatility is
quite low. In a general equilibrium model, this property of world interest rates prevents the
volatility of the IMRS from being high enough to produce the long-run equity premia found
in the data in the absence of borrowing and lending costs.
Our research is also related to the literature on world interest rate and government ex-
penditure shocks. As Mendoza (1991), Neumeyer and Perri (2005), and Uribe and Yue
(2006) show, shocks to world interest rates are important in driving business cycles in small
open economies. In our study, we use data from three Latin American emerging economies:
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. As documented in Bekaert and Harvey (2003), among other
studies, government expenditures, especially in the wake of fiscal imbalances, affect risk
premia in emerging markets. Moreover, Burnside et al. (2004) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2006) demonstrate that government expenditure shocks have a significant impact on busi-
ness cycles. In the case of Argentina especially, fiscal policy shocks have been identified as
destabilizing macroeconomic factors for quite some time. As a result, we include both world
interest rate and government expenditure shocks in our analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark economy
and defines the equilibrium. We discuss the data used and the calibration procedure in
Section 3, and in Section 4 we present both our equity return and business cycle moment
results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Benchmark Economy
We study a one sector economy in the benchmark model. This economy has three types of
agents: the representative domestic household, firms, and the government. A joint exogenous
stochastic process of productivity, the world interest rate, and government expenditures
drives the economy. We assume that in this economy, the government does not invest or
produce any goods and services. It collects a lump-sum tax to finance its expenditures.
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2.1 The Representative Household
The representative household chooses hours and consumption to maximize lifetime expected
utility given the budget constraint. The household receives profits, capital rents, and labor
income from the firms. There are two means to smooth consumption: purchase of one-
period international non-state contingent real bonds, and investment. The model has two
real frictions: investment adjustment costs as in Mendoza (1991), and borrowing and lending
costs for the household as in Uribe and Yue (2006). Formally, the representative household
maximizes life-time expected utility:
max
{ct,ht,it,kt+1,dt}
E0
∞∑
t=0
θtU(ct, ht), (2.1)
θ0 = 1, θt+1 = β(c˜t, h˜t)θt, t ≥ 0,
where E0 denotes the expectation operator conditional on information available at time t = 0.
The variables θt, ct, ht, it, kt+1, and dt denote the subjective discount factor, consumption,
hours, investment, capital, and net foreign debt position, respectively. The variables c˜t and
h˜t denote the cross-sectional averages of consumption and labor supply, respectively, which
the individual households take as given.1
We assume consumers have GHH preferences. The functional forms of the GHH utility
function and the subjective discount factor are given by:
U(c, h) =
(
c− hω
ω
)1−γ − 1
1− γ ,
β(c, h) =
(
1 + c− h
ω
ω
)−β1
,
where γ is the coefficient of risk aversion, and the IES can be shown to be approximately
equal to c−h
ω/γ
γc
.2 As long as β1 < γ, these preferences guarantee that there exists a unique
limiting distribution of state variables, and that the consumption good in every period is a
normal good; see Mendoza (1991). The suitability of GHH utility for dynamic programming
follows from Epstein (1983). It can be shown that, as with Epstein-Zin and in contrast to
CRRA preferences, GHH utility allows for separation of the coefficient of risk aversion and
1The cross-sectional means c˜t and h˜t are used to simplify computation of the representative household’s
optimal choice. Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) showed that use of either c˜t and h˜t or ct and ht leads to
almost identical impulse response functions.
2The derivation of the IES is shown in the Appendix.
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the IES, i.e., knowledge of γ is not sufficient to determine the value of the IES. Another
feature of GHH utility is that it rules out the wealth effect on the labor supply decision.
Following Mendoza (1991), we modify the GHH utility function such that the household
endogenizes its subjective discount rate of time preference. Let consumption be a composite
of final good consumption and the disutility of labor supply. Then the endogenous subjective
discount factor is decreasing in past consumption. As a result, GHH utility implies that
mean-reverting behavior exists in consumption. Whenever the representative household
changes its current consumption, both the marginal utility of current consumption and
the impatience level for future consumption change. Specifically, an increase in current
consumption causes a decrease in marginal utility. All else equal, this implies a comparable
increase in future consumption. However, the subjective discount factor decreases as well,
which ceteris paribus leads to a decrease in future consumption. Together, this means
that future consumption will not increase as much as today’s consumption does, indicating
reversion towards the mean.
Endogenizing the subjective discount factor is one way to modify the standard real busi-
ness cycle model to assure stationary behavior, as noted in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003).
It is important to point out, however, that this modified GHH utility is not suitable for in-
corporation of balanced growth as studied in, for example, Boldrin et al. (2001) and Aguiar
and Gopinath (2007).3 Accordingly, we do not consider the effects of economic growth in
our model; our focus is on business cycle fluctuations.
In each period the representative household is subject to the budget constraint:
dt + wtht + rtkt ≥ rft−1dt−1 + Ψ
(
dt − d¯
)
+ ct + it + Γt + Φ(kt+1 − kt). (2.2)
The variables rt and wt denote, respectively, the return on capital and the wage rate. The
variable rft is the world risk-free rate from period t to t + 1. We discuss the dynamics of
this variable in detail in our treatment of the driving force. The variable Γt denotes the
government lump-sum tax, and the variable kt is physical capital. Its law of motion is given
by:
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + it. (2.3)
We assume all equity is held by domestic households. In this economy, dividends are returns
to ownership of capital, which includes physical capital and intangible assets such as patents.
3If we assume that the subjective discount factor is constant, then balanced growth is admissible.
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Equity is assumed to be equivalent to the capital stock.
Ψ(dt − d¯) denotes borrowing costs and d¯ is the non-stochastic steady-state value of the
debt position. In the absence of borrowing and lending costs, households can borrow or lend
at the world interest rate freely. Practically, this is not a tenable assumption for most small
open economies. Only a handful of these countries have access to world debt markets with
trivial costs. We posit that households make their decisions based on the “effective interest
rate,” i.e., the interest rate faced by the households in a small open economy is usually
equal to world interest rate plus a markup. In our model this markup is a function of the
debt position of the economy. We follow Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003) and Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007) by defining borrowing and lending costs indirectly as:
1−Ψ′(dt − d¯) = 1
1 + ψ
[
exp
(
dt − d¯
)− 1] , (2.4)
where ψ > 0.
Φ(kt+1−kt) represents investment adjustment costs. As shown by Kydland and Prescott
(1982) and Jermann (1998), investment adjustment costs are important factors in explaining
business cycle movements and the equity premium. Following Mendoza (1991), we include
such costs in our model and assume its functional form to be:
Φ(kt+1 − kt) = φ
2
(kt+1 − kt)2 . (2.5)
The representative household is subject to the non-Ponzi-game condition:
lim
j→∞
Et
dt+j+1∏j
s=0 r
f
t+s
≥ 0. (2.6)
This rules out the possibility that the representative household borrows to finance its con-
sumption without limit.
The household’s utility maximization problem is characterized by: five first-order condi-
tions, the law of motion of capital held in each period, the period budget constraint, and
the non-Ponzi game condition. We are particularly interested in the optimality conditions
for debt (the world risk-free asset) and capital (the risky asset) and discuss these in more
detail below.
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2.2 Firms
There are a large number of identical, final good producing competitive firms. Firms, which
are fully owned by domestic households, produce the final goods by hiring labor and renting
capital. Each firm issues a single stock which is traded domestically. This assumption
about domestic ownership is made to simplify our model and also make it more theoretically
tractable.
Firms use constant returns to scale production technology given by:
yt = zth
α
t k
1−α
t ,
where the variables yt and zt denote output of the final good and total-factor productivity,
respectively. Productivity is assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1) process defined below
in Section 2.4. Since firms do not make the investment decision, their optimization problem
is static. They choose kt and ht to maximize the current period profit, given zt, rt, and wt:
max
{kt,ht}
Πt = zth
α
t k
1−α
t − rtkt − wtht.
The first-order conditions for the firms are standard and have the usual interpretation.
Profits are equal to zero since we have assumed constant returns to scale technology.
2.3 The Government
The government faces a stream of public expenditures, denoted by gt, that are exogenous,
stochastic, and nonproductive. These expenditures are financed by levying the lump-sum
tax Γt. The government’s sequential budget constraint is then given by:
Γt = gt, (2.7)
for t ≥ 0. To simplify our analysis we assume that government expenditures follow an AR(1)
process. We discuss this process next.
2.4 The Driving Force
This small open economy is driven by the joint exogenous processes of productivity, the
world interest rate, and government expenditures. In particular, we assume that productivity
follows an independent process, while the world interest rate and government expenditures
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are correlated.
The driving force is given by:
zˆt
rˆft
gˆt
 =

%z 0 0
0 %r 0
0 %gr %g


zˆt−1
rˆft−1
gˆt−1
+ Ω

εzt
εr
f
t
εgt
 , (2.8)
where zˆt and gˆt are, respectively, the Hodrick and Prescott (1997) (HP) filtered logarithm of
zt and gt, rˆ
f
t is the logarithm r
f
t, and the 3× 3 matrix Ω is given by
Ω =

σz 0 0
0 σfr 0
0 0 σg
 .
with σz > 0, σ
f
r > 0, and σg > 0. All the shocks are assumed to be independently and
identically standard normal random variables.
Our specification of the exogenous driving force follows the literature. In particular,
with respect to the government expenditures process, Burnside et al. (2004) and Ravn et al.
(2009) have adopted similar processes. In our numerical exercise, the structural parameters
%z and σz are calibrated. The other parameters in equation (2.8) are estimated based on the
available data by applying ordinary least squares. These estimated values are given in Table
1.
2.5 Competitive Equilibrium
In equilibrium all markets are cleared and:
c˜t = ct; h˜t = ht. (2.9)
The competitive equilibrium is defined in the standard form: as a sequence of real allocations
{ct, c˜t, ht, h˜t, it, kt+1, bt,Γt}∞t=0 and prices {rt, wt}∞t=0, given {rf−1, d−1, k0, z0, rf0, g0} and the
driving force, such that households maximize utility, firms maximize profit, the government
balances its budget, and all markets are cleared.
The DSGE model is solved by using perturbation methods as in, for example, Schmitt Grohe´
and Uribe (2004). A particularly attractive advantage of the perturbation method over other
approaches is that it can easily handle a model with many state variables.
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3 Data and Calibration
Our data are quarterly and we collected them from a variety of sources. To obtain equity
returns, we use the MSCI market return indices data from DataStream; the country returns
are computed by taking the log first differences of the market return indices. The differences
between US 3-month T-bill rates and expected inflation rates are our proxy for the world
risk-free rates. The expected inflation rates are given by the average inflation rates in the
previous four quarters; see Uribe and Yue (2006).
The other data we use are all from the International Financial Statistics data bank. The
lengths of the samples we have available vary across the different countries: the range for
Chile runs from the first quarter of 1996 to the third quarter of 2007, translating into 47
observations; the sample period for Argentina covers the period between the first quarter of
1993 to the third quarter of 2007, a total of 59 observations; and the sample period for Brazil
extends from the first quarter of 1991 to the third quarter of 2007, giving us 67 observations.
We transform the local-currency-denominated nominal per capita macroeconomic vari-
ables to US-Dollar-denominated real variables. All the series are deseasonalized, and the
cyclical components of output, investment, and government expenditures are obtained using
the HP filter.
To solve the model, we must select values for parameters which characterize the stochastic
shocks, preferences, and technology. These values are chosen to keep the model roughly
consistent with some empirical regularities observed in the business cycle and equity returns
in the sample countries. There are two steps in the calibration process.4 First, for a group
of parameters for each country, we determine parameter values by either setting them equal
to those used or established earlier in the literature, basing them on sample means, or
utilizing a steady-state optimality condition. Second, for those parameters with weak a priori
knowledge for which we do not have strong theoretical priors, we set values to maximize the
model’s ability to replicate a set of business cycle and asset pricing moments.
For some parameters, we follow Mendoza (1991) and set the risk aversion coefficient, γ,
to 2, the capital depreciation rate, δ, to 0.025, and the exponent of labor supply in the utility
function, ω, to 1.455. Several parameters have country-specific values. We use the sample
means of the corresponding data to determine the non-stochastic steady-state ratio of the
trade balance to GDP, stb, the ratio of government expenditures to GDP, sg, and the world
4By “calibration” we mean both assigning parameter values based upon the earlier literature and de-
termining parameters values through a moment-matching iterative procedure. This broad interpretation is
consistent with, for example, Jermann (1998).
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risk-free interest rate, rf. The labor income shares of GDP, α, are taken from the literature.
In particular, we follow Michalopoulos (1969) and set its value at 0.735 for Argentina, 0.71
for Brazil, and 0.676 for Chile.
The steady-state marginal return to capital, µk, is calculated from the deterministic
steady-state optimality condition µk = r
f − 1 + δ. The share of investment in value added,
si, is calculated through the following equation:
si =
i
y
=
δµkk
µky
=
δsk
µk
.
From the setup of the problem, the determination of the steady-state values of c and h
are independent of β1. Thus, after we calculate the steady-state values of c and h based upon
the data we have, the parameter β1 can be calibrated from the deterministic steady-state
optimality condition:
1 =
(
1 + c− h
ω
ω
)−β1
rf.
The calibrated value of β1 for all countries is less than γ, which we noted above is a necessary
condition to guarantee that GHH preferences have a unique limiting distribution of state
variables, and that the consumption good in every period is a normal good.
Given the regression results in Table 1, we can calibrate the values of the four structural
parameters ψ, φ, ρz, and σz. We do so by trying to match the standard deviation of output,
the standard deviation of investment, the first-order autocorrelation of output, and the
mean equity return through a grid search procedure. More specifically, we follow the same
calibration method as used in Jermann (1998) by searching over hundreds of thousands of
grid points, each defined by the quadruple formed by the particular values of these four
parameters. The values of the structural parameters are listed in Table 2.
4 Results
We find that the benchmark model is able to match selected business cycle moments and
the equity return.5 As shown in Table 3, the benchmark model can generate the standard
deviation of output, the standard deviation of investment, the first-order autocorrelation of
output, and the mean equity return found in the data.
The business cycle moments are in general more or less matched across countries. Com-
5The derivation of the equity return is shown in the Appendix.
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pared to the data, our benchmark model slightly overestimates the standard deviation of
output in Argentina and investment in Chile, and underestimates the first-order autocorre-
lation of output in Brazil.
Given the low level of the world interest rate for the sample period (around 0.8% per
quarter), our model generates high equity premia in all three countries. The model matches
the equity returns and equity premia in these countries very well. The best match is for
Chile, for which the numerical error is on the order of 10−4. Brazil is the worst case, for
which the generated equity return is about 0.04 percentage points smaller than the observed
sample return per quarter. Given the fact that no previous work has been able to successfully
match equity premia in a small open economy, we consider these results to be particularly
important. Our model can explain both business cycles and equity returns for a small open
economy.
We decompose the impact of productivity, world interest rate, and government expen-
diture shocks on equity premia.6 The decomposition results are shown in Table 5. From
these decompositions it is clear that productivity uncertainty is the most important factor in
determining the equity premium in the long run. In Argentina 92% of the equity premium
is explained by the compensation to productivity uncertainty. For Brazil this ratio is 67%,
and for Chile it is 87%. This finding is in line with the literature, since in the long run pro-
ductivity shocks are generally found to be the most important driving force in the economy.
The second most important risk is government expenditure uncertainty. In Brazil, 30% of
the equity premium is due to the compensation to uncertainty associated with this factor.
4.1 Intuition Behind the Equity Premium Result
We emphasize that this success is due to the imposition of the following three conditions:
GHH utility; borrowing and lending costs; and capital adjustment costs.7 Omission of any
one of these causes failure in generating successful results. We focus on why it is important
to impose borrowing and lending costs, since the necessity of the other two factors has been
discussed in the literature; see, for example, Boldrin et al. (2001), Jermann (1998), and
Constantinides and Duffie (1996).
6In the Appendix we show how the contribution of each shock is computed.
7Though we have not attempted to do so, we speculate that similar results could be achieved with habit
formation preferences in place of GHH utility. We decided to employ GHH preferences since the literature
has established that it is suitable for analysis of small open economies; see, for example, Mendoza (1991)
and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2003).
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Let λt and ϕt be the Lagrange multipliers associated with (2.2) and (2.3), respectively.
The Euler equation (4.1) represents the first-order condition with respect to the debt position:
(
1 + c˜t − h˜
ω
t
ω
)−β1
Et
λt+1
λt
=
[1−Ψ′(dt − d¯)]
rft
=
1
rft
{
1 + ψ
[
exp
(
dt − d¯
)− 1]} . (4.1)
There are two important features about equation (4.1). First, in this small open economy
{rft}∞t=0 is an exogenous process. Second, the term 1−Ψ′(dt− d¯) appears in the equation due
to the borrowing and lending costs introduced in (2.2). Both have important implications
for equity premia.
In the absence of the borrowing and lending marginal costs [1−Ψ′(dt− d¯)]−1, the exoge-
nous and smooth world interest rate forces the IMRS to be too smooth. Intuitively, without
the imposition of these costs, the supply of foreign financial assets is quite elastic. Holding
everything else constant, the effect of interest rate shocks would be absorbed by changes in
the international bond holding position to keep consumption smooth. Thus, the MRS would
be smooth, and the model would generate equity premia that are too low.8 Introduction of
borrowing and lending costs makes it harder to adjust the debt position to absorb the effect
of shocks, i.e., the supply of debt becomes inelastic. As a result, consumption becomes more
sensitive to exogenous shocks, such that the IMRS becomes more volatile. This is mechanism
is analogous to the introduction of capital adjustment costs making the supply of capital
inelastic; see Boldrin et al. (2001). It directly breaks down the link between the IMRS and
the world risk-free interest rate, and makes the supply of international bonds less elastic.
Equation (4.1) is the key to generating a sufficiently high equity premium when moving
from a closed economy to a small open economy. Without borrowing and lending costs,
equation (4.1) reduces to a standard bond pricing equation and the IMRS is, as a result,
forced to be too smooth. To demonstrate this point, we set ψ = 0 in equation (4.1) while
keeping the values of other parameters unchanged. The numerical results are shown in Table
4. Note that the model-generated equity premia are all too low in this case.
By comparing the results shown in Table 4 to those in Table 3, we argue that in a small
open economy it is important to impose borrowing and lending costs in order to generate
sufficiently high equity returns. Further, our model does not exhibit the “risk-free rate
volatility problem,” because the smooth world risk-free rates are exogenous with respect to
a small open economy; see, for example, Cochrane (2006), Boldrin et al. (2001), and Jermann
8This is also a problem in the closed economy. Both Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al. (2001) match the
equity premia at the cost of generating an excessively high volatility in the risk-free interest rate.
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(1998).
4.2 Discussion of Business Cycle Results
We report model-generated impulse-responses of aggregate consumption and output to pro-
ductivity, world interest rate, and government expenditure shocks. Our interest in doing
so is as follows. First, our framework provides a new mechanism to explain the sensitivity
of current consumption to current income and past interest rates. To numerically explore
the relationship between current consumption and current income, we require the impulse-
responses of both consumption and output to productivity shocks. So, we quantitatively
compute the response of output to productivity shocks even though it has been widely stud-
ied in the small open economy literature; see Mendoza (1991) and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2003), among others. Our impulse-response approach to studying consumption provides, we
believe, a useful complement to the two-stage regression procedure of Boldrin et al. (2001).9
Second, with a few exceptions such as Ravn et al. (2009), government expenditure shocks
have been less studied in the DSGE literature about small open economies. Both Burnside
et al. (2004) and Ravn et al. (2008), for example, consider government expenditure shocks
in a closed economy, and Mendoza (1991) does not discuss the impulse-responses of key
macroeconomic variables to government expenditure shocks. Accordingly, we decided to
analyze the effects of government expenditure shocks.
Figure 1 plots the response of consumption and output to a 1% increase in productivity.
Current consumption increases by 2.26% in Argentina, 2.03% in Brazil, and 2.55% in Chile,
from its corresponding non-stochastic steady state values. Current output increases by 2.02%
in Argentina, 1.95% in Brazil, and 1.87% in Chile, from its corresponding non-stochastic
steady state values. Combining the non-stochastic steady-state values of consumption and
output, the above results imply the following: 68% of the change of current output in
Argentina is manifested as a change in current consumption; in Brazil and Chile this effect
is 54% and 73%, respectively. These findings show that current consumption in our model
responds significantly to a temporary contemporaneous change in output. Thus, the excessive
sensitivity of consumption to income identified in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) is not a
puzzle according to our representative agent optimization model.
Figure 2 plots the response of consumption to a 1% increase in the world interest rate.
The fact that response functions are quite flat implies that the trade-off between current
9The impulse response functions directly measure the responses of variables of interest to structural
shocks. Accordingly, there is no endogeneity problem to be addressed.
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consumption and future consumption does not respond to a change in today’s risk-free
interest rate. The intuition behind this result is that, due to our use of GHH utility, the IES
in consumption, compared to that associated with the CRRA preferences case, is low. This
result is in line with the empirical finding in Campbell and Mankiw (1989) and the theoretical
prediction in Boldrin et al. (2001). However, our results also establish that factor-market
inflexibilities are not necessary conditions to explain the small response of consumption to
changes in risk-free interest rates.
Figure 3 plots the response of consumption and output to a 1% increase in government
expenditures. Consumption drops because of a negative wealth effect. As the government
uses more resources, fewer resources are available for households. This decreases house-
holds’ incomes and thus lowers consumption. We note that this result contrasts with what
is frequently reported in the literature on the response of private consumption to a posi-
tive government expenditure shock in a small open economy; see, for example, Ravn et al.
(2009). Output does not change initially but decreases later since the economy accumulates
relatively less capital through a crowding-out effect. As government expenditures increase,
the country’s debt position worsens. This leads to an increase in the effective interest rate
as the markup over the world risk-free rate increases due to borrowing and lending costs. As
a result investment decreases, which generates subsequent reductions in output.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis: Working-Capital Constraint
So far, output does not drop in response to a positive world interest rate shock. This is due
to the fact that with GHH utility, there is no wealth effect on labor supply; see, for example,
Chari et al. (2005). We are interested in modifying our model to produce an output drop
following a risk-free interest rate shock and examining whether, with this extension, the
model is still able to match the equity returns and other key business cycle moments found
in the data. To enable the model to replicate such a decrease in output, we impose a
working-capital constraint following Uribe and Yue (2006), which takes the form:
WKt ≥ ηwtht, (4.2)
where the variable WKt denotes the amount of working-capital and η > 0.
The representative firm’s debt position, dFt , evolves as:
dFt = r
∗
t−1d
F
t−1 − yt + wtht + µtkt + pit +WKt −WKt−1.
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where r∗t−1 = r
f
t−1
{
1 + ψ
[
exp
(
dt − d¯
)− 1]} is the effective interest rate. Defining the net
liability of the representative firm as at = r
∗
t d
F
t −WKt, we can rewrite the representative
firm’s budget constraint as:
at
r∗t
= at−1 − yt + wtht + µtkt + pit +
(
r∗t − 1
r∗t
)
WKt. (4.3)
Since the representative firm is owned by the representative household, the objective
function of firms is defined by:
max E0
∞∑
t=0
θt
λt
λ0
pit,
where λt denotes the marginal wealth utility of the representative household. The represen-
tative firm is also subject to the following non-Ponzi-game constraint:
lim
j→∞
Et
at+j
Πjs=0r
∗
t+s
≤ 0. (4.4)
The introduction of the working-capital constraint will only change the optimality condition
for labor demand.
Labor demand is determined by the following equation:
wt
[
1 + η
(
r∗t − 1
r∗t
)]
= αztk
1−α
t h
α−1
t . (4.5)
Since any real-valued process {at}∞t=0 which satisfies (4.3) and (4.4) will be optimal for
the representative firm, we follow Uribe and Yue (2006) and set at = 0. Hence, only one
parameter (η) in equation (4.2) needs to be calibrated. Once again following Uribe and Yue
(2006), we set η = 1.2, which means that the representative firm needs to save money to be
able to pay the wage bill for at least 1.2 quarters.
Table 3 reports our numerical results with the working-capital constraint. It is clear
that the working-capital constraint has only a small impact on both business cycle and
equity premium moments. Once we shut down the borrowing and lending costs channel,
the introduction of the working-capital constraint cannot generate sufficiently high equity
returns, as shown in Table 4. Indeed, the results reported in this table suggest that, in
this case, the working-capital constraint has practically no effect on the model’s ability in
generating equity premia of the appropriate size.
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5 Conclusions
The model we develop in this paper is the first in the literature to match key business
cycle moments and long-run equity returns in a small open economy with production; we
do so using data from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. We obtain these results through three
modifications to a standard real business cycle model: introducing borrowing and lending
costs; imposing capital adjustment costs; and assuming GHH preferences. Our main finding
is that the borrowing and lending cost constraint is crucial for our model to generate long-run
equity returns that are sufficiently high to replicate what is observed in the data. Though
it is useful in matching additional business cycle moments, the working-capital constraint
we also analyze can not play the role of the borrowing and lending cost channel in terms
of producing equity returns of the appropriate size. Our analysis also establishes that it is
useful to consider using GHH preferences, in addition to habit formation and Epstein-Zin
utility, in modeling asset-pricing behavior. In sum, we believe the model makes significant
progress in addressing the equity premium puzzle for a small open economy with production.
When we decompose the contributions of productivity, world interest rate, and govern-
ment expenditure shocks to the long-run equity premium, we find that productivity shocks
are the most important factor behind equity premia in a small open economy. For Ar-
gentina, Brazil, and Chile, we respectively find that 92%, 67%, and 87% of the long-run
equity premium is explained by the compensation to productivity uncertainty. These results
are consistent with results reported in the real business cycle literature on the dominant
long-run driving force role played by productivity shocks. We believe these are new results
for the small open economy literature.
Our model provides a benchmark for doing policy analysis in a small open economy.
Following Barro (2009), if a model can not explain the key features of asset prices, i.e.,
does not satisfy the “Atkeson-Phelan principle”, the welfare analysis of consumption uncer-
tainty based on the model is less meaningful. Since our model is the first which satisfies the
“Atkeson-Phelan principle” in the small open economy context with production, we arguably
provide an appropriate framework for analyzing the welfare effects of macroeconomic fluc-
tuations in such a setting. Further, since the smooth world risk-free interest rate is taken as
given, our small open economy model does not exhibit the “risk-free rate volatility problem”
generically present in the large open economy case.
We believe the results of this paper will prove useful to those interested in estimating
endowment or production-based DSGE models with asset pricing. More specifically, we
have in mind how our paper can be helpful for researchers considering Bayesian estimation
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of such models; Gallant and McCulloch (2009), for example, argue that through careful use
of priors Bayesian methods can overcome the problems facing classical statistical analysis of
these models. Given our success in replicating business cycle moments and long-run equity
returns, the calibration parameters we use can serve as priors for Bayesian estimation of
asset-pricing DSGE models for the small open economies we study.
There is, however, scope for improvement in our analysis. First, we are unable to match
the second moment of long-run equity returns. In this respect our work is similar to Jermann
(1998), but differs from Boldrin et al. (2001); the latter can match the Sharpe ratio in the
US data used in Cecchetti et al. (1993). In future work we hope to resolve this issue for the
small open economy with production framework we study in this paper.
Second, the model generates some counterfactual results. In particular, consumption
drops in the presence of a positive government expenditure shock, which is in contrast to
what is found in the data. A possible resolution would be to extend the model by introducing
relative deep habits as in Ravn et al. (2009).
Third, the model does not include investment-specific shocks, which the literature has
argued are an important driving force of business cycles. Generalizing the model to allow
for investment-specific shocks is an additional extension we plan to consider in later work.
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Table 1: Estimated Parameters of the Driving Force
Country %r %gr %g σr σg
Argentina 0.9986 1.2008 0.8206 0.001 0.1134
Brazil 0.9834 0.3565 0.7924 0.001 0.1225
Chile 0.9882 -0.0778 0.8296 0.001 0.0349
Notes: Reported values are OLS parameter estimates of the driving force for each economy as specified in
sˆt = %sˆt−1 + εt, where sˆt = (zˆt, rˆft, gˆt)′, zˆt and gˆt are the HP-filtered logarithm of zt and gt, rˆft is the
logarithm rft, zt is total factor productivity, r
f
t is the world interest rate, gt is government expenditures,
and εt = (εzt , ε
r
t , ε
g
t )
′. The parameters %r and %g represent autoregressive terms in the driving force for,
respectively, the world interest rate and government expenditures, and %gr is the interaction term between
government expenditures and world interest rates. σr and σg represent the standard errors of regression of
the OLS fitted equations for the world interest rate and government expenditure processes. See equation
(2.8).
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Table 2: Structural Parameter Calibration
Country ρz σz φ ψ γ ω δ stb sg α
Argentina 0.70 2.5e-3 10 4.00 2 1.455 0.1 1.00e-02 0.127 0.735
Brazil 0.50 4.0e-3 50 0.14 2 1.455 0.1 2.29e-02 0.195 0.710
Chile 0.55 3.5e-4 34 7.10 2 1.455 0.1 5.01e-02 0.115 0.676
Notes: Reported values are calibrated parameters in this study. ρz and σz are, respectively, the first-order au-
toregressive parameter and the standard deviation of the productivity process. φ and ψ are, respectively, the cost
parameters for capital adjustment costs and borrowing and lending costs. γ is the coefficient of risk aversion, ω is the
GHH exponent of labor supply, and δ is the capital depreciation rate parameter. stb and sg represent, respectively,
the non-stochastic steady-state ratio of the trade balance to GDP and the ratio of government expenditures to GDP.
α is the labor share of national income.
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Table 3: Equity Returns, Equity Premia and Selected Business Cycle Moments
Country Business Cycle Moments Equity Returns Equity Premia
σY σI ρ(Yt, Yt−1) Et(rt+1) Et(rt+1 − rft)
Argentina Model 18.3 22.1 83 3.98 3.16
WK 18.4 21.8 83 4.04 3.22
Data 17.2 22.2 81 4.00 3.18
Brazil Model 18.3 20.5 70 5.71 4.87
WK 18.1 19.4 69 5.64 3.81
Data 18.3 19.9 82 5.75 4.92
Chile Model 6.71 8.72 83 2.01 1.21
WK 7.23 9.10 85 2.08 1.28
Data 6.73 10.8 85 2.01 1.21
Notes: All values are in percentages. σY and σI are, respectively, the standard deviations of output and investment,
ρ(Yt, Yt−1) denotes the first-order autocorrelation of output, and Et(rt+1) is the expected value of equity returns.
Rows labeled as “Model” refer to our GHH utility-based model with capital adjustment and borrowing and lending
costs. Rows labeled as “WK” refer to our model with the imposition of the working-capital constraint to generate an
output drop, following the formulation in Uribe and Yue (2006). Rows labeled as “Data” report the unconditional
sample moments.
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Table 4: Equity Returns and Equity Premia without Borrowing and Lending Constraint
Country Equity Returns Equity Premia
Et(rt+1) Et(rt+1 − rft)
Argentina Model 0.98 0.16
WK 1.00 0.18
Data 4.00 3.18
Brazil Model 1.14 0.31
WK 1.13 0.30
Data 5.75 4.92
Chile Model 0.88 0.08
WK 0.89 0.09
Data 2.01 1.21
Notes: See notes to Table 3. This table demonstrates the impact of shutting down the borrowing and lending
constraint. By imposing ψ = 0, equation (4.1) collapses to the usual RBC risk-free asset pricing equation.
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Table 5: Decomposition of Equity Premia
Country εzt ε
rf
t ε
g
t
Argentina 92 0 8
Brazil 67 3 29
Chile 87 8 5
Notes: All values are in percentages. The table reports the contribution of a shock to each of the three exogenous
state variables, i.e., a productivity shock (εzt ), a world interest rate shock (ε
rf
t ), and a government expenditures
shock (εgt ), on the level of the equity premium in each country.
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Figure 1: Response of Consumption and Output to a 1% Productivity Shock.
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Notes: The values on the vertical axis represent deviations from the non-stochastic steady state, normalized to zero,
and the values on the horizontal axis depict number of periods after initial shock. The unit of measurement for
both axes is percentages. The impulse-response functions were obtained by computing the values of consumption
and output after applying a 1% productivity shock to the system.
26
Figure 2: Response of Consumption to a 1% World Interest Rate Shock.
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Notes: See notes to Table 1. The impulse-response functions were obtained by computing the values of consumption
after applying a 1% world interest rate shock to the system.
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Figure 3: Response of Consumption and Output to a 1% Government Expenditure Shock.
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Notes: See notes to Table 1. The impulse-response functions were obtained by computing the values of consumption
and aggregate output after applying a 1% government expenditures shock to the system.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Asset Pricing
6.1.1 Definition
We have the following Euler equation with respect to the choice for tomorrow’s capital:
1 = Et

(
1 + ct − h
ω
t
ω
)−β1 (
ct+1 − h
ω
t+1
ω
)−γ
(
ct − h
ω
t
ω
)−γ
 qt+1
pt
, (A-1)
where:
pt = 1 + φ(kt+1 − kt), (A-2)
qt+1 = 1− δ + φ(kt+2 − kt+1) + rt+1. (A-3)
The equity return is defined as:
rbt+1 =
qt+1
pt
, (A-4)
and the pricing kernel is defined as:
Mt+1 =
(
1 + ct − h
ω
t
ω
)−β1 (
ct+1 − h
ω
t+1
ω
)−γ
(
ct − h
ω
t
ω
)−γ . (A-5)
Before we derive the first-order approximation solution to the equity return and equity
premium, we discuss the first-order approximation solution to our DSGE model first. There
are five state variables in the model. Three of them are exogenous, zt, r
f
t, and gt, and two
are predetermined, kt and dt. Let st = [kt, dt, zt, r
f
t, gt]
′. Then the first-order approximation
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solutions for equity returns are given by:
cˆt = Ac × sˆt, (A-6)
hˆt = Ah × sˆt, (A-7)
rˆt = Ar × sˆt, (A-8)
dˆt+1 = Ad × sˆt, (A-9)
kˆt+1 = Ak × sˆt, (A-10)
sˆt+1 = ρsˆt + Λσεt+1, (A-11)
where
ρ =

A1k A
2
k A
3
k A
4
k A
5
k
A1d A
2
d A
3
d A
4
d A
5
d
0 0 %z 0 0
0 0 0 %r 0
0 0 0 %gr %g

, et+1 =

0
0
εzt+1
εrt+1
εgt+1

, and Λ =

0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 σz 0 0
0 0 0 σr 0
0 0 0 0 σg

,
Ak =
(
A1k A
2
k A
3
k A
4
k A
5
k
)
, and Ad =
(
A1d A
2
d A
3
d A
4
d A
5
d
)
. Here xˆt = log
(
xt
x¯
)
and x¯ denotes the non-stochastic steady state of variable x. The vector A’s are functions of
the steady state and structural parameters. Their values come from the numerical solution.
Once we numerically obtain (A-6)-(A-11) numerically, we can use them to derive the
equity return and equity premium. That is what we show next.
6.1.2 Log-Linearizing pt
pˆt = φkkˆt+1 − φkkˆt = φkAk × sˆt − φkkˆt. (A-12)
6.1.3 Log-Linearizing qt+1
qˆt+1 =
φ
1− δ + r¯ kˆt+2 −
φ
1− δ + r¯ kˆt+1 +
r¯
1− δ + r¯ rˆt+1
=
φ
1− δ + r¯ (Ak × sˆt+1 − Ak × sˆt) +
r¯
1− δ + r¯Ar × sˆt+1. (A-13)
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6.1.4 Log-Linearizing rt
It is clear from the optimality condition that:
hω−1t = αztk
1−α
t h
α−1
t
⇒ ht =
(
αztk
1−α
t
) 1
ω−α
⇒ rˆt+1 = zˆt+1 + (−α) kˆt+1 + αhˆt+1
= zˆt+1 + (−α) kˆt+1 + α
ω − αzˆt+1 +
α(1− α)
ω − α kˆt+1
=
ω
ω − αzˆt+1 +
α− ω − ω(1− α)
ω − α kˆt+1
6.1.5 Log-Linearizing Equity Returns
We can represent the stochastic process of equity returns as:
rˆbt+1 =
φ
1− δ + r¯ (Ak × sˆt+1 − Ak × sˆt) +
r¯
1− δ + r¯Ar × sˆt+1
−
(
φkAk × sˆt − φkkˆt
)
. (A-14)
6.1.6 Log-Linearizing the Stochastic Discount Factor
From (A-5), we can write the pricing kernel as:
log (Mt+1) = −β1 log
(
1 + ct − h
ω
t
ω
)
− γ log
(
ct+1 − h
ω
t+1
ω
)
+ γ log
(
ct − h
ω
t
ω
)
So, we have:
mt+1 = log (Mt+1) = −A1t − A2t + A3t (A-15)
m¯ = −A¯1 − A¯2 + A¯3
The approximation of A1t is given by:
A1t = A¯
1 + κ1c cˆt + κ
1
hhˆt, (A-16)
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where:
κ1c =
∂A1t
∂ log(ct)
| Nonstochastic Steady State = β1c¯(
1 + c¯− h¯ω
ω
)
κ1h =
∂A1t
∂ log(ht)
| Nonstochastic Steady State = −β1h¯
ω(
1 + c¯− h¯ω
ω
)
The approximation of A2t is given by:
A2t = A¯
2 + κ2c cˆt+1 + κ
2
hhˆt+1, (A-17)
where
κ2c =
γct+1(
ct+1 − h
ω
t+1
ω
) | Nonstochastic Steady State = γc¯(
c¯− h¯ω
ω
)
κ2h =
−γhωt+1(
ct+1 − h
ω
t+1
ω
) | Nonstochastic Steady State = −γh¯ω(
c¯− h¯ω
ω
)
The approximation of A3t is given by:
A3t = A¯
3 + κ3c cˆt + κ
3
hhˆt, (A-18)
where
κ3c =
γct(
ct − h
ω
t
ω
) | Nonstochastic Steady State = γc¯(
c¯− h¯ω
ω
)
κ3h =
−γhωt(
ct − h
ω
t
ω
) | Nonstochastic Steady State = −γh¯ω(
c¯− h¯ω
ω
)
Combining (A-15)-(A-18), we have:
mt+1 = A
3
t − A1t − A2t (A-19)
=
(
A¯3 + κ3c cˆt + κ
3
hhˆt
)
−
(
A¯1 + κ1c cˆt + κ
1
hhˆt
)
−
(
A¯2 + κ2c cˆt+1 + κ
2
hhˆt+1
)
=
(
A¯3 − A¯1 − A¯2)+ (κ3c − κ1c) cˆt + (κ3h − κ1h) hˆt − (κ2c cˆt+1 + κ2hhˆt+1)
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Note that in the non-stochastic steady state:
A¯3 = A¯2.
We can simplify (A-19) as:
mt+1 = −A¯1 +
(
κ3c − κ1c
)
cˆt +
(
κ3h − κ1h
)
hˆt −
(
κ2c cˆt+1 + κ
2
hhˆt+1
)
= −A¯1 + χ1cˆt + χ2hˆt + χ3cˆt+1 + χ4hˆt+1 (A-20)
Plugging (A-6), (A-7), and the solutions to rˆt+1 and kˆt+1 into (A-20), we get the following:
mt+1 + A¯
1 = mˆt+1 = χ1Ac × sˆt + χ2Ah × sˆt
+χ3Ad × sˆt+1 + χ4Ak × sˆt+1.
= (χ1Ac + χ2Ah) sˆt + (χ3Ad + χ4Ak) sˆt+1
= ∆1sˆt + ∆4sˆt+1, (A-21)
where ∆1 = (χ1Ac + χ2Ah) and ∆4 = (χ3Ad + χ4Ak). Using (A-11) in (A-21), we get:
mˆt+1 = ∆1sˆt + ∆4 (ρsˆt + Λσet+1) . (A-22)
6.1.7 Equity Premium and Equity Returns
The equity premium is given by:
Etrbt+1 − rft = r¯f
(
Etrˆbt+1 − rˆft
)
,
where r¯f = r¯b. Since:
rˆbt+1 =
φ
1− δ + r¯ (Ak × sˆt+1 − Ak × sˆt) +
r¯
1− δ + r¯Ar × sˆt+1
−
(
φkAk × sˆt − φkkˆt
)
,
mˆt+1 = ∆1sˆt + ∆4 (ρsˆt + Λet+1) ,
we get the following:
rˆbt+1 =
(
φAk
1− δ + r¯ +
r¯Ar
1− δ + r¯
)
sˆt+1 =
(
φAk
1− δ + r¯ +
r¯Ar
1− δ + r¯
)
Λet+1
mˆt+1 = ∆4 (ρsˆt + Λet+1) = ∆4Λet+1
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So, the equity premium is given by:
Etrbt+1 − rft = −r¯f × COVt
{
∆4Λet+1,
(
φAk
1− δ + r¯ +
r¯Ar
1− δ + r¯
)
Λet+1
}
,
and the equity return is given by:
Etrbt+1 = rft − r¯f × COVt
{
∆4Λet+1,
(
φAk
1− δ + r¯ +
r¯Ar
1− δ + r¯
)
Λet+1
}
,
where:
et+1 =
(
0 0 εzt+1 ε
r
t+1 ε
g
t+1
)′
.
Define:
ezt+1 =
(
0 0 εzt+1 0 0
)
,
ert+1 =
(
0 0 0 εrt+1 0
)
,
egt+1 =
(
0 0 0 0 εgt+1
)
.
Then, the contribution of each shock is given by:
contribution from z shock =
−r¯f × COVt
{
∆4Λe
z
t+1,
(
φAk
1−δ+r¯ +
r¯Ar
1−δ+r¯
)
Λezt+1
}
−r¯f × COVt
{
∆4Λet+1,
(
φAk
1−δ+r¯ +
r¯Ar
1−δ+r¯
)
Λet+1
} × 100
contribution from rf shock =
−r¯f × COVt
{
∆4Λe
r
t+1,
(
φAk
1−δ+r¯ +
r¯Ar
1−δ+r¯
)
Λert+1
}
−r¯f × COVt
{
∆4Λet+1,
(
φAk
1−δ+r¯ +
r¯Ar
1−δ+r¯
)
Λet+1
} × 100
contribution from g shock =
−r¯f × COVt
{
∆4Λe
g
t+1,
(
φAk
1−δ+r¯ +
r¯Ar
1−δ+r¯
)
Λegt+1
}
−r¯f × COVt
{
∆4Λet+1,
(
φAk
1−δ+r¯ +
r¯Ar
1−δ+r¯
)
Λet+1
} × 100
6.2 Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution for GHH Utility:
The Euler equation with respect to the bond holding position without borrowing and lending
is given by:
λt = βr
f
tλt+1.
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Thus, we have:
∂ ln
(
Uct+1
Uct
)
∂ ln rft
= −1.
Since we are interested in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), we need to
calculate the value of ∂ ln
(
Ct+1
Ct
)
/∂ ln rft. To obtain what we want, we compute a first-order
Taylor approximation of lnUct and lnUct+1 :
lnUct+1 = ln(Uc) +
[∂ lnUct+1
∂ lnCt+1
|Ct+1=C¯
]
[lnCt+1 − C¯],
lnUct = ln(Uc) +
[∂ lnUct
∂ lnCt
|Ct=C¯
]
[lnCt − C¯].
It is easy to see that:
ln
(Uct+1
Uct
)
=
∂ lnUc
∂ lnC
ln
(Ct+1
Ct
)
,
IES =
−1
∂ lnUc
∂ ln c
|c=c¯
.
Next, consider the following expressions:
C − h
ω
ω
=
(
rf
)1/β1 − 1,
lnUc = −γ ln
(
C − h
ω
ω
)
.
At the steady state we know that:
∂ lnUc
∂ lnC
=
∂ lnUc
∂C
.
∂C
∂ lnC
=
−γC
C − hω
ω
.
So, gathering terms and plugging in, we have:
IES =
−1
∂ lnUc
∂ lnC
=
C − hω
γ
γC
<
1
γ
.
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